ICC and Africa: Costs and Benefits of Withdrawal

  1. a) Benefits
  2. Sovereignty
  3. African Solutions to African problems
  1. Neo-Colonialism
  2. African Union
  3. b) Costs
  4. Transnational judicial infrastructure
  5. Impunity and Atrocity
  1. Eliminating a Last Resort
  2. c) In Conclusion: Should African states withdraw?

 Introduction

What would be the costs and benefits, for African states, of their potential withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (henceforth: ICC)? This essay will be examining African state-members of the ICC and evaluating their potential withdrawal of support from the ICC and the Rome Statute. States, in this sense, refers to the organised political community, rather than exclusively the government. The reason for this is a common divide between the well-being of the government, the people and the institution of the state. When discussing the topic of the ICC, where impunity and state-led atrocities are so important, it is necessary to make this distinction between what is good for the ruler and what is good for the nation. Withdrawal entails a rejection of the Rome Statute, an official withdrawal from the court and a refusal to cooperate with the ICC going forward. Costs will be deemed to be factors negatively affecting the well-being of the state. Benefits will be deemed to be improvements which otherwise could not be gained under the ICC, according to opponents of the court and the fulfilment of stipulated goals by African states.

This essay will begin by expanding upon the necessary background for understanding the discourse. This will begin with an examination of the ICC’s founding and the involvement of African states. It will then expand onto the contemporary situation and illustrate some major criticisms of the court by African states.

Benefits of withdrawal will be dealt with first, examining core benefits of withdrawal. Each claim will be evaluated to determine if it is a realistic benefit. Costs of withdrawal will then be examined and evaluated in a comparable way to the benefits.

Ultimately, the goal of this essay is to determine if African states should withdraw, based on a critical cost/benefit analysis.

Background

The ICC was founded in July 17 1998 with the creation of the Rome Statute. In 1999, Senegal became the first country to ratify the treaty in 1999.[1] Africa’s relationship with the ICC began with enthusiasm, with extensive influence by African states in the drafting of the Rome Statute.[2] The Southern African Development Community (SADC) supported the founding of the court, having an impact on the founding principles of the statute through the use of the SADC principles, alongside the Dakar declaration, as guiding documents.[3] Support for the founding of the court was popular among African states due to a desire to end atrocities across the continent, being especially poignant in the shadow of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.[4] Over and above this initial support, Max du Plessis argues that Africa is very well represented at the ICC.[5] This is due to Africa’s extensive membership of the court and the number of African judges serving in the court. The ICC, today, still enjoys popular support among many African scholars and civil society.[6] As reported by Elise Keppler, over 160 organisations across Africa have expressed support for the ICC and have called for increased state cooperation.[7]

The ICC’s core function is to prosecute war criminals and committers of vast human rights abuses. This is accomplished by complementing national courts and acting as a court of last resort.[8] This function is governed by a principle of ‘complementarity’, whereby the ICC works with local courts with their consent and invitation.[9] The main strategy of the court is to target ‘big fish’ while leaving smaller criminals to the national courts, with aid.[10] The ICC can only investigate cases referred to them or by order from the United Nation’s Security Council (UNSC). Reportedly, all self-referrals, of nations asking the court for help investigating crimes, come from Africa.[11]

Despite avid popular approval, the ICC has been condemned by many African leaders in recent years. President Kagame of Rwanda has accused the ICC of being a new form of imperialism.[12] Jean Ping, former African Union (AU) chairperson condemned the court for undermining Africa’s ability to solve its own problems.[13] Robert Mugabe, as AU chairperson in 2015, called for non-compliance with the ICC.[14] These accusations against the ICC centre around the idea that the ICC is a Western tool, that it discriminates against Africa and that it undermines African efforts to solve their own problems.[15]

Mahmood Mamdani has described the ICC as employing international justice as a guise for big power politics, being used by the US and the UNSC to target enemies of the West, while protecting its allies.[16] Leaders have echoed similar sentiments. John Mukum Mbaku reports a belief that the ICC is not concerned with genuine justice, but rather only acting as a political entity.[17] A sense of discrimination has arisen among African leaders as a result of the fact, brought up by Burundi (who has recently withdrawn from the ICC) that nine out of ten ICC cases involve Africa.[18] Gambia has accused the ICC of racism, due to it not prosecuting non-Africans.[19] In addition, there is a notion that the ICC has prevented Africans from solving their own problems, this being stated by Jean Ping, among others. There are other criticisms, but these are the core issues. These, and the others, will be evaluated later in the essay to determine their validity and severity.

Not all African states share these criticisms, however. Botswana, notably, has opposed anti-ICC sentiments.[20] Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia have also expressed their support for the court.[21] Scholars and journalists have arisen in support of the court, arguing that opposition to the court is in support of impunity.[22] African opposition to the ICC is by no means unanimous and there is a feeling among many, that elites and their cronies are only opposing the ICC as a scapegoat for their regime’s problems and to prevent their own prosecution.

The major cases of ICC criticism arise from four cases: Kenya, the Congo (DRC), Sudan and Uganda. In Kenya, criticism arises from the feeling that the ICC is interfering with an elected head of state.[23] In the DRC, even with the need for an ICC supported judicial system to fill their lack of a substantive legal infrastructure, the ICC has still come under attack for failing to solve the country’s political issues (despite that not being their job).[24] The arrest warrant for Sudan’s president al-Bashir has caused much worry that the move will threaten regional stability.[25] Uganda’s case has shown how the ICC has been used by governments to increase their own power.

In lieu of the ICC, potentially withdrawn states have implied their intention to use the AU as a substitute. Mangu, among others, argues that this is unlikely to proceed.[26] This is due to past precedents of the AU protecting its member leaders, regardless of their crimes. Rather than an impartial court of justice, the AU acts as a club for rulers promoting mutual impunity.[27] This may the very reason many leaders want to opt for an AU-led court, as it ensures their safety from prosecution.

What is clear is that Africa originally favoured the ICC, but that those sentiments have changed, partly due to actions by the court but also perhaps due to changing priorities of African leaders While selfish reasons for this are likely, there are a number of pertinent criticisms that must be evaluated and will be in the subsequent cost/benefit analysis.

Costs and Benefits Analysis

The following sections will be analysing the costs and benefits of a potential withdrawal of African states from the ICC. This analysis will begin by analysing the benefits and then critically evaluating each claim. These benefits are the ensuring of sovereignty, a move towards African self-determination, allowing reconciliation, opposing neo-colonialism and increasing AU involvement.

The costs of withdrawal will be that it will eliminate African state’s access to an existing transnational judicial infrastructure, eliminate a deterrence to impunity and human rights abuse, will cost states their use of the ICC as a source of legal legitimacy and will ultimately cost Africa the ICC as a court of last resort.

a)   Benefits

                I.            Sovereignty

A withdrawal from the ICC would, hypothetically, ensure the sovereignty of African states. Many see the ICC’s actions as an invasion of African sovereignty.[28] The Kenyan case, especially, gave credence to the idea that the ICC is intervening in the affairs of democratically elected leaders, giving rise to disillusionment in the court.[29] The ICC is meant to respect national sovereignty, balancing it with its function of fighting impunity.[30] Many African leaders argue that this balancing act is failing and that the ICC has blatantly violated their sovereignty. As such, a benefit of withdrawal would be that African states would be free from foreign intervention and thus be free to handle their own affairs, enabling some of the other benefits that will be dealt with shortly. But, is this claim true?

Investigation by the ICC requires consent of the national government, except in exceptional circumstances.[31] One such controversial circumstance is Sudan, which was ordered to be investigated by the UNSC. Even then, Totten and Tyler argue that the ICC hasn’t violated the principle of complementarity in Sudan.[32] Despite not being invited, the prosecutor’s investigation is allowed due to Sudan’s inability or unwillingness to prosecute a crime that threatens international stability and justice.[33] Even so, there is still a feeling that this violates sovereignty. But even if the ICC is violating sovereignty, is ensuring this sovereignty a real benefit? Independence is assumed to be a positive for states, but this independence is hollow when the state fails to address atrocities or commits them themselves. As Max du Plessis puts it, many of these critiques are borne from an outdated view that sovereignty trumps human rights.[34] States enter into alliances and treaties for benefits, taking on the costs as worth it for the sake of the boons. The benefit of ICC membership will be discussed throughout this essay, but in essence, it is fighting against impunity and atrocity. ICC-members entered into the agreement knowing that the cost would be potential interference, but that the benefits of ensuring a peaceful and just state are even larger. As will be discussed under costs, the ICC has been helping to ensure such a scenario. A sovereign state that does not respect human rights is not worth being sovereign, for it eliminates the very purpose of its existence, the protection of its citizens. For this reason, sovereignty is not a compelling benefit for withdrawing from the ICC.

             II.            African Solutions to African problems

Jean Ping accused the ICC of undermining Africa’s effort to solve its own problems.[35] This arises as a part of the common rhetoric of ‘African problems, African solutions’. Without the ICC as a crutch, or an interferer, African states could, hypothetically, develop their own legal infrastructure in order to solve crimes their own way. This would allow African states to develop along their own paths, finding out what is best for them and more effectively dealing with local issues due to their proximity and understanding of the crime. But, this is unlikely. The ICC has acted to complement and aid the development of African legal infrastructure.[36] One can argue that this makes African states lax and unwilling or unable to find their own solutions, but some foreign justice is better than no justice at all.[37] The DRC, for one, lacks a judicial system developed enough to deal with war crimes, so the ICC is needed to fill the gap.[38] A healthy state requires a healthy judiciary. If the national government cannot provide an adequate judiciary, it is better to have the option of the ICC as a helper and last resort. Rather than withdrawing for this reason, national governments should embrace cooperation with the ICC and develop legislation that will aid in their prosecutions, increasing the legal stability of the state.[39] ‘African solutions for African problems’ is a misnomer. Cilliers et al lament that the term is a mere guise for dictators and criminals attempting to avoid prosecution.[40] There is justice and an aversion to justice. The ICC is the only option for justice for many African contexts, and even if a crutch, is a very necessary crutch.

         III.            Reconciliation

The retributive justice of the ICC gets in the way of reconciliation and finding peaceful solutions, some argue.[41] The role of the ICC is to prosecute perpetrators, not to reconcile people and act as a peacemaker.[42] African leaders have stated their desire for a more ‘harmonized’ and ‘peace’-emphasising approach.[43] Without the ICC as a looming threat to reconciliation efforts, African states could hypothetically work towards peacemaking. South Africa has already stated its opposition to the arrest of al-Bashir as it allegedly contradicts their opposition as regional peacemaker.[44]

But, as has been the case with the previously mentioned benefits, this is also not a compelling enough advantage to justify a withdrawal from the ICC. The reason for this is that the ICC’s actions may already be contributing to reconciliation. Firstly, this can be seen in the ICC’s method of ‘individualising guilt’ to avoid collective blame.[45] The ICC targets individuals, rather than group entities. This allows them to eliminate trouble-makers and then enable peacemaking between two more understanding parties. One could still argue, however, that the ICC still ignores the underlying issues of African conflict, rather attempting a simply retributive approach to justice. But ICC justice and an examination of the deeper causes of African conflict are not mutually exclusive. ICC investigations in Uganda helped make negotiations with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) possible, as it frightened the leadership of the group, enabling attempts at negotiation.[46] Even more importantly, justice deters those who would threaten the peace. Reconciliation may not be the end-game of the ICC, but peace is. Simply, justice doesn’t necessarily endanger peace. Rather, justice can bring about peace by deterring those that would threaten it.[47]

          IV.            Neo-Colonialism

Several African leaders and a few scholars have accused the ICC of being a form of neo-colonialism, a tool of Western powers and a symbol of African victimhood. Withdrawal would allow African states to no longer be subject to a tool of Western imperialism and would send a message to the international community that Africa will no longer be unduly influenced by foreign powers.

This would be a compelling benefit, if it were true. Unfortunately, these accusations seem convincing due to the emotive connection to historical colonialism.[48] Accusations that the ICC unfairly targets Africa hold little value as the cases are brought forward by Africans themselves.[49] Africa is also well-represented among the staff and, as mentioned earlier, in the founding of the court.[50] Focus on Africa is not a new scramble for Africa, since the victims and referrers are mainly African.[51]

Where this criticism of the ICC is arguable is that the UNSC does have undue power over the court. The fact that the US and other non-signatories to the Rome Statute have power over its proceedings is troublesome. It is understandable that many would see it as unfair and problematic that the US can preach international justice, while refusing to be party to it. Rather than withdrawing, however, African states should be supporting the court and opposing US (among other countries) exceptionalism. Africa should own the ICC, not literally, of course, but in a sense that they support it to such a degree that they send a message to the international community that Africa supports the principles of international justice. The only benefit to be garnered in relation to neo-colonialism is to address the emotional opposition to the ICC, rather than any genuine colonial intentions or actions.

             V.            African Union

If African states withdraw from the ICC, the African Union (AU) would step in as a substitute, being able to avoid the foreign intervention that has damaged the ICC in the past. Many African states would still need help to gain judicial infrastructure and the AU would step in to aid them.[52] With the ICC out of prosecutions, the AU, alongside African states, could keep proceedings at a grassroots level, maintaining attention to detail.[53] Some have proposed that an African court could be more effective at fighting impunity, but so far, a lack of capacity and political will has prevented any establishment of an African equivalent to the ICC, despite stated desires.[54] AU states would also be better equipped to oppose foreign dictates upon their foreign policy. This would allow them to fulfil their desire to avoid prosecution of al-Bashir.[55] But, it is doubtful that this would lead to any better form of justice than under the ICC. The AU has proven to be merely a club to protect its members.[56] Due to this, scholars have called it a ‘stumbling block’ to human rights on the continent.[57] Above this, there are doubts that there is enough political will to even attempt a substantive African court.[58] Simply, the AU is unlikely to yield better results than the ICC.[59]

b)   Costs

                 I.            Transnational judicial infrastructure

The ICC is a developed and existing transnational judiciary. It is staffed with experienced individuals, has an established framework and a track record of investigations and proceedings. The ICC currently aids African states in helping them establish their own legal frameworks.[60] It contributes to states by instilling a respect for the rule of law, that contributes to a stable and more effective judiciary.[61] Moreover, the ICC provides a very much needed ‘last resort’ court for cases that African states need to solve but cannot. Cases brought to the ICC have been, by and large, due to an inability or unwillingness by African states to solve the issues themselves.[62] This transnational infrastructure also helps in investigating transnational crimes. In central Africa, where borders are blurred by paramilitary groups, this is a very important feature. Leaving investigation to national courts, that are not guaranteed to work together or have no framework for working together, is highly problematic. Rather, leave the work to the ICC, which has the framework and the experience.

Countries, like the DRC, do not have an adequate judicial system.[63] While the ICC is drastically undermanned and underfunded, this is no excuse to leave.[64] Rather, states should be working together with the ICC to ensure that all parties involved continue to develop effective tools for justice. Withdrawing would take away any possibility of this and leave African states without an effective recourse in case their already failing judicial systems need help.

              II.            Impunity and Atrocity

The ICC has proven to be a deterrent to human rights abuses and an enemy of impunity.[65] Above their current track record, there is still huge potential for them to continually deter atrocities and war crimes globally.[66] Justice, besides the cathartic and moral value, is a practical form of deterrence against actions that are damaging to states, society and people. Human rights abuses are detrimental to a state and war crimes negatively affect the stability of a region. Impunity spits in the face of democracy as it elevates a few capricious individuals to an untouchable level. Scholars and civil society have expressed their appreciation for the ICC as a deterrent to these negative aspects. In response to South Africa refusing to arrest al-Bashir, Mangu accused South Africa of ‘backpedalling on human rights and the rule of law’.[67] In the DRC, the ICC is threatening the impunity of previous un-prosecutable criminals.[68] Opposition to the ICC has often, accurately, been construed as support for impunity.[69] This comes as closer investigation of ICC critics among leaders reveals that the critics fear prosecution themselves.[70] The problem with these criticisms is, if heeded, they increase the impunity of leaders guilty of crimes. A disempowered ICC will no longer be able to create precedents to deter atrocity and impunity. This will mean a less accountable Africa with no substantive efforts to end atrocities, as much of it is caused by leaders immune to prosecution.

          III.            Legal Legitimacy

States who are party to the Rome Statute enjoy a level of legal legitimacy which helps in terms of international relations and the government’s domestic conduct. Withdrawing would cost states this legal legitimacy, damaging their international image to other countries and potential investors. ICC membership is a form of certification which does encourage trust in a nation. One drawback of this is that this legal legitimacy has given some governments undue legitimacy at the expense of impartiality. In Uganda, there is a perception that the ICC has given Musaveni’s government an inappropriate amount of power, which contributes to one-sided investigations in relation to the LRA.[71] Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner argue that the ICC has allowed factions in Uganda and Sudan to use international justice as an ideology to vilify their political opponents.[72] In Uganda, after the government called in the ICC, the ICC condemned the LRA before investigation.[73] This ignores heinous actions by the Ugandan government.[74] The fear is that the ICC’s allegiance to some factions over others may run counter to justice. The status of the court as a legitimate and international entity then makes it hard to question its judgements. This bias towards the dominant regime may be a negative aspect of the ICC, but the providing of the legal legitimacy to the government does benefit the stability of a state, even if it may be counter to justice on some levels. A withdrawal from the ICC would cost governments legal legitimacy in terms of international perception and their ability to raise themselves up as a legitimate legal entity over other factions functioning in the state.

           IV.            Eliminating a Last Resort

It should be emphasised that one of the major costs of withdrawal from the ICC would be the loss of the ICC as a last resort solution. The ICC isn’t perfect. It is undermanned and underfunded.[75] The UNSC has an undue amount of influence over its proceedings.[76] It does give preferential treatment to regimes at the expense of justice.[77] It is an imperfect court, but as Thuli Mandonsela said:

“Better to have an imperfect court than none at all. It’s like saying because we don’t catch all the criminals we shouldn’t hold trials.”[78]

The track record of African states does show an inability to replace the ICC as a transnational court against human rights abuses. On a national level, nations have shown an incapability to build their own sufficient judicial infrastructure. The AU is no genuine alternative, as it has proven to be an organisation pro-impunity rather than justice. If there is any development of an African court, it should rather work alongside the ICC, as suggested by Botswanan foreign minister, Pelomini Venson-Moitoi.[79] There is little to no compelling reason to abandon the ICC as a complementary and last resort court. Abandoning it, rather than reforming and supporting it, seems a case of throwing out the baby with the bath water. Simply enough, there will, in all likelihood, come a case where an African state will need the resources and expertise of the ICC and find no help from its own judiciary and the AU. When it comes to that time, an ICC as a court of last resort would be helpful.

c)    In Conclusion: Should African states withdraw?

The results of this cost benefit analysis lead to the question of if the African states should withdraw. On benefits of withdrawal, this essay has shown that: the ICC does not violate sovereignty, and that even if it did, it would not be a compelling enough benefit to abandon the court; ‘African solutions for African problems’ is a misnomer, and that rather than a benefit, the loss of ICC help will become an additional cost; reconciliation can be achieved through ICC-provided justice; the only substantial benefits in terms of neo-colonialism are emotive; and that the African Union will not be able to be a profound substitute. Overall, this sub-heading may be a bit deceptive, as I could not find any substantially convincing benefits to withdrawing from the ICC. The only advantages seem to be for the perpetrators themselves, who would benefit from a lack of judicial infrastructure, as will be seen now in the findings of costs to leaving.

African states need the ICC to provide a transnational legal infrastructure. Leaving would strip them of the ability to use an experienced and established legal framework that has been filling the void of an underdeveloped African judicial infrastructure. Very importantly, withdrawal from the ICC would cost states an effective deterrence against human rights abuses and encourage impunity. Withdrawal would also cost states a form of legal legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and as a tool to instil political stability by shutting down opposing factions. Finally, withdrawal is a case of throwing the baby out with the bath water, as states would lose access to the ICC as a court of last resort that will likely be needed in the future.

Overall, the costs of withdrawal far outweigh the benefits, with little to no benefits being found for withdrawing. The consensus among scholars seems to be that the ICC should be improved upon, not left. Calls for withdrawal seem to be arising primarily from those perpetrating crimes, further highlighting why one needs to be careful when dealing with emotive condemnations. Ultimately, there is no compelling benefit to leaving the ICC, while the costs are too overwhelming to justify a withdrawal from the court.

Conclusion

This essay has considered the question of the costs and benefits of a potential withdrawal from the ICC by African states. Contextually, Africa played a big part in the creation of the ICC and that this could explain its current involvement in the institution. But, its initial enthusiasm has turned to ire due to an idea that they are being unfairly targeted by the court. Costs and benefits were outlined and evaluated and the essay ultimately found no substantive benefits to withdrawal and overwhelming costs, leading this essay to ultimately find it imprudent for any withdrawal from the ICC. Rather, states should increase their support of the court in order to reform and improve its functions. It is important to keep these costs and benefits in mind in order to oppose the emotive condemnation of the ICC by many leaders who have been shown to oppose the ICC on selfish grounds. For the interest of African states as political communities in need of a rule of law and justice, membership of the ICC is valuable and sometimes even integral for a stable and just state. Going forward, it is important to keep in mind that, despites its imperfection, the ICC is a boon for Africa.

References

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[1] Charles Chernor Jalloh, “Africa and the International Criminal Court: Collision Course or Cooperation?” North Carolina Central Law Review 34 (2012): 201.

Footnotes

[2] Max du Plessis, The International Criminal Court that Africa wants, (Institute of Security Studies, 2010), 6.

[3] Ibid., 7.

[4] Philipp Kastner, “Africa — A Fertile Soil for the International Criminal Court?” Die Friedens-Warte  85, no. ½ (2010): 132.

[5] Du Plessis, The International Criminal Court that Africa wants, 6

[6] André Mbata Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” African Development 40, no. 2 (2015): 10.

[7] Elise Keppler, “Managing Setbacks for the International Criminal Court in Africa,” Journal of African Law 56, 1 (2012): 8.

[8] Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, “International Criminal Justice, Peace and Reconciliation in Africa: Re-imagining an Agenda Beyond the ICC,” African Development 40, no. 2 (2015): 257.

[9] Claire Brighton, “Avoiding Unwillingness: Addressing the Political Pitfalls Inherent in the Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court,” International Criminal Law Review 12 (2012): 629-630.

[10]Chandra Lekha Sriram and Stephen Brown, “Kenya in the Shadow of the ICC: Complementarity, Gravity and Impact,” International Criminal Law Review 12 (2012): 224.

[11] Du Plessis, The International Criminal Court that Africa wants, 36.

[12] Ibid., 20.

[13] Ibid., 19-20.

[14] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 23.

[15] Du Plessis, The International Criminal Court that Africa wants, 13.

[16] Ibid., 20.

[17] John Mukum Mbaku, International Justice: The International Criminal Court and Africa, The Brookings Institution (2012), 10.

[18] Abraham Joseph, Why Did South Africa, Burundi and Gambia Decide to Leave the International Criminal Court? The Wire, accessed May 15, 2017, https://thewire.in/76869/why-did-south-africa-burundi-and-gambia-decide-to-leave-the-international-criminal-court.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Keppler, “Managing Setbacks for the International Criminal Court in Africa,” 5.

[21] Joseph, Why Did South Africa, Burundi and Gambia Decide to Leave the International Criminal Court?

[22] Ibid.

[23] Mbaku, International Justice: The International Criminal Court and Africa, 11.

[24] Geraldine Mattioli and Anneke van Woudenberg, “Global Catalyst for National Prosecutions? The ICC in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” in Courting Conflict, ed. Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark (London: Royal African Society, 2008), 57.

[25] Odinkalu, “International Criminal Justice, Peace and Reconciliation in Africa: Re-imagining an Agenda Beyond the ICC,” 279.

[26] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 7.

[27] Ibid., 27.

[28] Ingrid Roestenburg-Morgan, The International Criminal Court in Africa, NVVN, accessed May 15, 2017, http://www.nvvn.nl/artikel/the-international-criminal-court-in-africa.

[29] Brighton, “Avoiding Unwillingness: Addressing the Political Pitfalls Inherent in the Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court,” 664.

[30] Ibid., 631.

[31] Ibid., 633.

[32] Christopher D. Totten and Nicholas Tyler, “Arguing for an Integrated Approach to Resolving the Crisis in Darfur: The Challenges of Complementarity, Enforcement, and Related Issues in the International Criminal Court,” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 98, no. 3 (2008): 1069.

[33] Ibid., 1081.

[34] Max du Plessis, The International Criminal Court that Africa wants, 82.

[35] Ibid., 19-20.

[36] Odinkalu, “International Criminal Justice, Peace and Reconciliation in Africa: Re-imagining an Agenda Beyond the ICC,” 257.

[37] And the ICC is not foreign justice. Many of the judges are African and African states accepted and even developed the principles of the ICC’s justice. It is very much also African justice.

[38] Mattioli and Woudenberg, “Global Catalyst for National Prosecutions? The ICC in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 57.

[39] Keppler, “Managing Setbacks for the International Criminal Court in Africa,” 12.

[40] Jakkie Cilliers, Sabelo Gumedze and Thembani Mbadlanyana, “Africa and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: What role for the ICC?” Irish Studies in International Affairs 20 (2009): 67.

[41] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 16.

[42] Ibid., 19.

[43] Max du Plessis, The International Criminal Court that Africa wants, 51.

[44] Karen Allen, Is this the end for the International Criminal Court? BBC, accessed May 15, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37750978.

[45] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 17.

[46] Nick Grono and Adam O’Brien, “Justice in Conflict? The ICC and Peace Processes,” in Courting Conflict, ed. Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark (London: Royal Africa Society, 2008), 15.

[47] Ibid., 13.

[48] Keppler, “Managing Setbacks for the International Criminal Court in Africa,” 7.

[49] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 19-20.

[50] Max du Plessis, The International Criminal Court that Africa wants, 6.

[51] Ibid., 45.

[52] Mbaku, International Justice: The International Criminal Court and Africa, 11.

[53] Ibid., 10.

[54] Max du Plessis, Tiyanjana Maluwa and Annie O’Reilly, “Africa and the International Criminal Court,” International Law 2013, no. 1 (2013): 10.

[55] Max Du Plessis and Christopher Gevers, “Making amend(ment)s: South Africa and the International Criminal Court from 2009 to 2010: Africa and the International Criminal Court,” South African Yearbook of International Law 34, no. 1 (2009): 3.

[56] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 27.

[57] Cilliers, Gumedze and Mbadlanyana, “Africa and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: What role for the ICC?” 66.

[58] Allen, Is this the end for the International Criminal Court

[59] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 10.

[60] Ibid., 19.

[61] Mattioli and Woudenberg, “Global Catalyst for National Prosecutions? The ICC in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 55.

[62] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 24.

[63] Mattioli and Woudenberg, “Global Catalyst for National Prosecutions? The ICC in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 57.

[64] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 19.

[65] Cilliers, Gumedze and Mbadlanyana, “Africa and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: What role for the ICC?” 64.

[66] Kastner, “Africa — A Fertile Soil for the International Criminal Court?” 131.

[67] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 24.

[68] Mattioli and Woudenberg, “Global Catalyst for National Prosecutions? The ICC in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 55.

[69] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 26.

[70] Joseph, Why Did South Africa, Burundi and Gambia Decide to Leave the International Criminal Court?

[71] Sarah M. H. Nouwen and Wouter G. Werner, “Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal

Court in Uganda and Sudan,” The European Journal of International Law 21, no 4 (2011): 950.

[72] Ibid., 941.

[73] Ibid., 952.

[74] Ibid., 950.

[75] Mangu, “The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview,” 19.

[76] Keppler, “Managing Setbacks for the International Criminal Court in Africa,” 9.

[77] Nouwen and Werner, “Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal

Court in Uganda and Sudan,” 941.

[78] Allen, Is this the end for the International Criminal Court

[79] E. Van Trigt, Africa and withdrawal from the ICC, Peace Palace Library, accessed May 15, 2017, https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/2016/10/africa-and-icc-withdrawal.